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Abstract 
 
When performance measures are used for evaluation purposes, agents have some 
incentives to learn how their actions affect these measures. We show that the use of 
imperfect performance measures can cause an agent to devote too many resources 
(too much effort) to acquiring information. Doing so can be costly to the principal 
because the agent can use information to game the performance measure to the 
detriment of the principal. We analyze the impact of endogenous information 
acquisition on the optimal incentive strength and the quality of the performance 
measure used. 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 Introduction
One of the main themes of the multitask agency literature is the insight that mo-
tivating desirable actions may encourage other, less desirable actions (Holmstrom
and Milgrom, 1991; Feltham and Xie, 1994). In the accounting literature, one
prominent example of negative activities is earnings manipulation. We argue that
information acquisition, which is typically considered as a pro￿table action, may
also belong to this class of negative activities that are hard to control.
We consider a setting in which an agent is hired to choose an action (e⁄ort level)
on behalf of a principal. When the principal, who wishes the agent to work hard
on his task, uses an incentive system, then the agent is encouraged to ￿rst learn
how his actions will a⁄ect the underlying performance measure. This information
is valuable to the agent, since from his perspective it leads to improved action
choices.
When the principal￿ s objective is available for contracting purposes, the agent￿ s
information gathering is always bene￿cial to the principal. It leads to improved
decisions from the perspective of the agent as well as the principal. However, it
is often impossible to base the contract on the principal￿ s objective, which leads
to the use of alternative performance measures (Baker, 1992; Feltham and Xie,
1994). In this case two questions arise that we address in this paper. First, when
is the agent￿ s incentive to learn more about how actions a⁄ect the performance
measure bene￿cial and when is it detrimental to the principal? Second, how does
the agent￿ s incentive to gather information a⁄ect the optimal incentive strength
and the quality of a performance measure?
To answer the ￿rst question, we show that the use of imperfect performance
measures may cause the agent to spend too much of his resources on information
acquisition.2
From the principal￿ s perspective, overinvestment in information gathering may
arise because the agent can use information to the detriment of the principal;
information might lead to actions that increase the value of the performance mea-
sure but decrease the utility of the principal. Following Baker (1992), we call this
sort of behavior ￿gaming￿ . Hence, the principal may be better o⁄ if the agent
does not perfectly understand how his actions a⁄ect the performance measure:
less information leads to less gaming.
For the second question, we ￿nd that endogenous information acquisition has
an impact on the optimal design of the contract. In our model, incentives may be
low-powered not only to limit the amount of distortion (incongruity), given that
the agent perfectly knows how to game the performance measure (as in Baker,
1992, and Feltham and Xie, 1994) but also to reduce the agent￿ s incentive to gather
information in the ￿rst place as this information enables the agent to engage in
gaming. In sum, incentives may be muted to induce the agent to pay less attention
to the performance measure.
We also show that endogenous information acquisition a⁄ects the quality of
performance measures. Baker (1992) and Feltham and Xie (1994) show that
the quality of a performance measure depends on its distortional e⁄ects. In our
model, the amount of distortion is not exogenous but instead depends on the level
of information the agent has about the performance measure. If the agent does
not perfectly understand how his actions a⁄ect the performance measure, he is less
able to game this measure. Hence, the quality of a performance measure not only
depends on its distortion, given that the agent knows how to game this measure,
but also on the di¢ culty (cost) of obtaining this information in the ￿rst place.
We show that performance measures that are di¢ cult to ￿ understand￿may be
better suited to provide the right incentives.
Closest to our paper are Baker (1992) and Bushman et al. (2000). These
two papers discuss issues of performance measurement under private information.
Baker focuses on incentive provision given that the agent is always (exogenously)3
informed about how actions a⁄ect the performance measure. Bushman et al.
analyze the value of delegation by comparing the outcome of a delegation scheme
in which the agent is (imperfectly) informed about the performance measure with
the outcome of a centralized scheme in which this information is not available.
In this setting the principal might be worse o⁄ with a delegation scheme because
the agent can use his private information to shirk. Christensen (1981) analyzes a
model where pre-decision information can also be negative, because it allows the
agent to exert just enough e⁄ort to reach a certain target. None of these papers
look at contracts designed to in￿ uence the agent￿ s information acquisition. We
extend Baker￿ s model to analyze the impact of endogenous information gathering
on incentive contracting and the quality of performance measures.
This paper is also linked to recent studies on the role of information acquisi-
tion in principal-agent relations. This literature typically analyzes how agents can
best be motivated to gather decision-relevant, i.e., valuable, information (Lam-
bert, 1986; Demski and Sappington, 1987; Lewis and Sappington, 1997). There
are only a few papers that discuss situations in which the agent￿ s information ac-
quisition is detrimental to the principal (e.g., Cremer and Khalil, 1992; Cremer et
al., 1998). In these contributions, information acquisition is prior to contracting.
The agent bene￿ts from pre-contract private information because he can use this
information to extract information rents. In our setting, the reason why infor-
mation acquisition may be detrimental is not based on information rents, but on
the fact that additional information may lead to ine¢ cient actions. The main
di⁄erence between our paper and these cited papers is our focus on performance
measurement.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we outline the basic model. In Sec-
tion 3 we discuss a benchmark setting in which the agent is exogenously informed.
Section 4 introduces endogenous information acquisition. Section 5 provides an
example for the negative e⁄ect of information acquisition. Section 6 concludes.4
2 The Model
In our model there are two risk-neutral parties, a principal and an agent. The
principal delegates a decision to the agent. We model this decision as e⁄ort choice
e 2 [0;1): The principal￿ s utility
V (e;￿) = v(￿)e
depends on the chosen e⁄ort level, e; and the productivity of e⁄ort, v(￿) > 0.
Productivity depends on the realized state of nature, ￿; which is a random variable.
Hence, productivity is also random and its expected value is E[v(￿)]: The agent￿ s
e⁄ort choice is unobservable to the principal and is associated with cost 0:5e2. The
utility of the principal is not contractible and not transferable. However, there
exists a performance measure on which the agent￿ s pay can be based on:
Y (e;￿) = y(￿)e;
where y(￿) > 0 is the marginal product of e⁄ort on the performance measure.
Without loss of generality, E[v(￿)] = E[y(￿)] = ￿:1 We assume that the expected
productivity, ￿; the correlation between y(￿) and v(￿); denoted ￿; and the vari-
ances V ar(y(￿)) and V ar(v(￿)) are common knowledge.
We consider only linear incentive schemes. The agent￿ s pay is
w(e;￿) = bY (e;￿) ￿ F;
where b is the bonus coe¢ cient and F is a ￿xed transfer from the agent to the
principal.
The principal proposes an incentive system as a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er; the
agent￿ s reservation utility is zero. At the time of contracting, neither the agent
nor the principal know ￿. After signing the contract but before choosing e, the
agent observes ￿ with probability p 2 [0;1]. ￿ is soft information and cannot be
1It is possible to adjust the performance measure so that the expected payo⁄s are identical.
See Baker (1992) for a discussion of this assumption and the example in this paper.5
transferred to the principal. Indeed, the principal does not know whether the
agent is informed or not.
If the agent observes ￿, he knows v(￿) and y(￿). If not, he knows only ￿.
Depending on his information, the agent chooses the action that maximizes his
utility. The principal￿ s utility in state ￿ is V (e;￿)￿w(e;￿) and the agent￿ s utility
is w(e;￿) ￿ 1
2e2.
The ￿rst-best level of e⁄ort is efb = ￿ without information about ￿ and efb =
v(￿) if ￿ is known. For clarity, in the remainder of the paper, we write v and y
instead of v(￿) and y(￿); respectively.
In addition to agents being risk neutral, we assume that there are no wealth
constraints. Therefore, all distortions arise solely because the performance mea-
sure is not a perfect proxy for the principal￿ s objective. However, we note that
all qualitative results extend to the case in which the agent is wealth constrained
(limited liability).
3 Exogenous Information
As a benchmark, we consider a setting where p is exogenously given and common
knowledge. The agent chooses his e⁄ort level to maximize the expected payo⁄
subject to his information. The e⁄ort is e0 = b￿ without information and e1 = by
with information.
The principal￿ s problem is
max
b;e0;e1;F
(1 ￿ p)(￿e0 ￿ b￿e0) + p(E[ve1] ￿ bE[ye1]) + F (1)
subject to
e0 = b￿; (2)
e1 = by; (3)
F ￿ (1 ￿ p)
￿
b￿e0 ￿
1
2
e
2
0
￿
+ pE
￿
bye1 ￿
1
2
e
2
1
￿
: (4)6
The principal chooses the incentive system to maximize her expected utility.
The incentive constraints (2) and (3) characterize the agent￿ s optimal action
choices without and with information, respectively. The participation constraint
(4) ensures that the agent accepts the contract. For the optimal F, the constraint
is binding. Using these constraints, the principal￿ s utility for a given p can be
de￿ned as a function of b;
￿p(b) ￿ (1 ￿ p)￿0(b) + p￿1(b);
where ￿0(b) ￿ b￿2 ￿ 1
2b2￿2 and ￿1(b) ￿ bE[yv] ￿ 1
2b2E[y2] denote the principal￿ s
expected utilities if the agent is uninformed and informed, respectively.
Maximizing this expression for b yields
b
￿
p =
pCov(v;y) + ￿2
pV ar(y) + ￿2
and the principal￿ s utility is
￿
￿
p =
1
2
(pCov(v;y) + ￿2)2
pV ar(y) + ￿2 :
We distinguish two special cases in which the agent is either never informed
(p = 0) or always informed (p = 1):
Case p = 0. Given that there is no information about the realized state ￿;
the performance measure is a perfect proxy for the principal￿ s utility. In this
case there are no frictions, and the ￿rst-best e⁄ort is implemented. The optimal
incentive intensity is b￿
0 = 1 and the principal￿ s utility is ￿￿
0 = 1
2￿2:
Case p = 1: For p = 1 the model resembles the model analyzed by Baker
(1992). The optimal bonus coe¢ cient is
b
￿
1 =
E[yv]
E[y2]
=
Cov(v;y) + ￿2
V ar(y) + ￿2 (5)
and the expected utility of the principal becomes
￿
￿
1 =
1
2
E[yv]2
E[y2]
=
1
2
(Cov(v;y) + ￿2)
2
V ar(y) + ￿2 :
If the correlation between y and v is one and V ar(y) = V ar(v); then the perfor-
mance measure is a perfect proxy for the principal￿ s objective. Thus, b￿
1 = 1 and7
the principal achieves the ￿rst best outcome. In all other cases, the performance
measure is distorted, in the sense that it does not motivate the right behavior.
That is, the agent allocates e⁄ort ine¢ ciently across di⁄erent states of the world.
(In contrast, in the multi-task models of Feltham and Xie (1994), Datar et al.
(2001), and Baker (2002) the agent allocates e⁄ort ine¢ ciently across di⁄erent
tasks.)
We de￿ne ￿ = Cov(v;y)=V ar(y) and note that from (5) it follows directly
that b￿
1 < 1 , ￿ < 1 and b￿
1 > 1 , ￿ > 1: For the sake of providing the
intuition it is useful to assume that the two variables are normally distributed.
In this case E[vjy] ￿ ￿ = ￿(y ￿ ￿): ￿ is a measure for the conditional expected
deviation of v from ￿ relative to a deviation of y from ￿: ￿ < 1 implies that
the expected deviation of the principal￿ s utility is lower than the deviation of
the performance measure. Since the agent bases his e⁄ort on the performance
measure, the agent￿ s reaction to realizations of the performance measure is too
strong from the principal￿ s perspective, for b = 1. To counteract this e⁄ect, the
principal ￿nds it bene￿cial to choose an incentive intensity lower than one. But
reducing b comes at a the cost of reducing the agent￿ s expected e⁄ort. An extreme
situation of misallocation arises, e.g., if the correlation between v and y is negative.
The agent will then choose a high level of e⁄ort when a low level is desirable, and
vice versa.
In contrast, for ￿ > 1; the conditional expected change in the principal￿ s ob-
jective exceeds changes in the performance measure. Therefore, for b = 1; the
agent￿ s reaction to variations in ￿ is too weak. The agent pays too little attention
to his private information. The principal counteracts by choosing b > 1; with the
cost that the agent￿ s expected e⁄ort is too high.
We note that even when the correlation between v and y is perfect and b = 1,
incentives are distorted for V ar(v) 6= V ar(y) because the agent either over- or
underreacts to his private information.8
In sum, the bonus coe¢ cient serves two roles. It motivates the agent to work
hard and to allocate e⁄ort e¢ ciently across di⁄erent states of the world. The
principal must trade o⁄ these two goals when choosing the incentive intensity of
the contract.
Lemma 1 Given V ar(v); the principal￿ s utility depends on ￿ and V ar(y):
@￿￿
1
@￿
> 0;
@￿￿
1
@V ar(y)
8
> <
> :
> 0 if ￿ > 1
< 0 if ￿ < 1:
An increasing correlation ￿ leads to less distorted incentives. Therefore, the
principal￿ s utility increases with ￿. Moreover, the principal￿ s utility increases as
￿ converges to one, because the agent￿ s action choice is either too responsive or
not responsive enough for ￿ 6= 1:
Is the principal better o⁄with an informed or an uninformed agent? The value
of an informed agent to the principal is
￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
0 =
1
2
(Cov(v;y) + ￿2)2
V ar(y) + ￿2 ￿
1
2
￿
2:
We refer to this di⁄erence as the value of information.
Lemma 2 The value of information is negative whenever
Cov(v;y)
2 < (V ar(y) ￿ 2Cov(v;y))￿
2: (6)
If (6) holds, the principal prefers the agent to be uninformed about ￿. When the
value of information is negative, the agent￿ s reaction to his private information is
detrimental to the principal. That is, from the principal￿ s perspective, additional
information does not improve decision making but makes it worse. Clearly, for
￿ ￿ 0; the value of information is always negative. To see this, rearrange (6) to
Cov(v;y)(Cov(v;y) + 2￿2) < V ar(y)￿2. Since Cov(v;y) + ￿2 = E[vy] > 0; (6) is
always satis￿ed for ￿ ￿ 0. But the value of information can also be negative if9
￿ = 1 and V ar(y) is much larger than V ar(v). The reason for this result is that
when V ar(y) > V ar(v); the agent￿ s reaction to variations in ￿ is too strong. This
overreaction is costly to the principal since the agent￿ s cost function is convex.
The comparative statics in Lemma 1 (for p = 1) also hold for any intermediate
probability p 2 (0;1). The principal￿ s expected utility increases when ￿ becomes
large and when V ar(y) converges to Cov(v;y) (￿ converges to 1). If the principal
could choose p; she would choose p = 0 if (6) holds and p = 1 otherwise.
4 Endogenous Information Acquisition
We now examine the case in which information acquisition is endogenous. After
signing the contract but before making the action choice e, the agent can acquire
information. The agent chooses the probability of becoming informed, p, at a
personal cost k(p); where k(0) = 0; k0(0) = 0; k0(p) > 0 for p > 0, k00(p) > 0, and
limp!1 k0(p) = 1. That is, the higher the probability of obtaining information,
the higher the cost the agent must incur. The agent￿ s choice of p is unobservable
to the principal and solves
max
p (1 ￿ p)
￿
b￿e0 ￿
1
2
e
2
0
￿
+ pE
￿
bye1 ￿
1
2
e
2
1
￿
￿ k(p)
with e0 = b￿ and e1 = by: The ￿rst-order condition for p is
1
2
b
2V ar(y) ￿ k
0(p) = 0: (7)
A positive bonus coe¢ cient b, which provides the agent with incentives to exert
e⁄ort e; simultaneously generates incentives for the agent to gather information.
The chosen p increases in b and V ar(y). Intuitively, when V ar(y) becomes large,
the information becomes more valuable to the agent so that he works harder on
information production.10
The principal￿ s problem is
max
p;e0;e1;F;b
(1 ￿ p)E[ve0 ￿ bye0] + pE[ve1 ￿ bye1] + F
subject to (2), (3), (7) and
F ￿ (1 ￿ p)
￿
b￿e0 ￿
1
2
e
2
0
￿
+ pE
￿
bye1 ￿
1
2
e
2
1
￿
￿ k(p): (8)
The participation constraint (8) is again binding at the optimum. We can use
constraints (2), (3) and (8) to rewrite the principal￿ s objective function. The ob-
jective function is identical to the one with exogenous information net of k(p): But
now the principal, by choosing b, also determines p. The maximization problem
subject to the remaining incentive constraint (7) can be written as Lagrangian
max
p;b;￿
L = pb
￿
Cov(v;y) ￿
1
2
bV ar(y)
￿
+ b￿
2
￿
1 ￿
1
2
b
￿
￿k(p) + ￿
￿
1
2
b
2V ar(y) ￿ k
0(p)
￿
;
with ￿ as Lagrangian-multiplier. The ￿rst-order conditions for an optimum in-
clude
@L
@b
= pCov(v;y) ￿ pbV ar(y) + ￿
2(1 ￿ b) + ￿bV ar(y) = 0; (9)
@L
@p
= bCov(v;y) ￿
1
2
b
2V ar(y) ￿ k
0(p) ￿ ￿k
00(p) = 0: (10)
Equations (10) and (7) yield
￿ =
bCov(v;y) ￿ b2V ar(y)
k00(p)
: (11)
Substituting (11) into (9) and using (7) yields
b
￿(p) =
Cov(v;y)
￿
p + 2
k0(p)
k00(p)
￿
+ ￿2
V ar(y)
￿
p + 2
k0(p)
k00(p)
￿
+ ￿2
: (12)
b￿ and p￿ are determined by (12) and (7). For ￿ = 1 and V ar(v) = V ar(y) we
again obtain the ￿rst-best solution with b￿ = 1:11
In most other cases the agent￿ s choice of p is not optimal from the perspective
of the principal. A positive (negative) ￿ implies that, in equilibrium, a marginal
increase in p increases (decreases) the principal￿ s utility. For a given incentive
intensity, b, ￿ is positive if
￿ > b: (13)
Substituting (12) into (13) and rearranging yields Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 From the principal￿ s perspective, in equilibrium, the agent under-
invests in information if
￿ > 1 (14)
and overinvests in information if the inequality is reversed.
Proposition 1 implies that whenever ￿ 6= 1; the agent￿ s level of information
acquisition is not in the best interest of the principal.
If ￿ > 1; additional information is more valuable to the principal than to the
agent. Hence, in the optimal solution, the agent devotes too few resources to
acquiring information. A better-informed agent is bene￿cial to the principal,
since the agent will use this information to make a better action choice e: This
case is in the spirit of the traditional information acquisition literature (Lambert,
1986), where information gathering is motivated in order to obtain better-informed
decision making.
In contrast, if ￿ < 1; additional information is relatively more valuable to the
agent than to the principal. Hence, the agent devotes too much e⁄ort to acquiring
information. Rewriting the condition as ￿￿v < ￿y we see that if ￿ and ￿v are small,
the agent￿ s private information has low value to the principal, but when ￿y is large,
additional information about y is relatively important to the agent. Consequently,
the agent overinvests in information.
The agent￿ s information acquisition is costly to the principal for two reasons.
First, the agent will use his private information to game the performance measure
to the detriment of the principal (as noted in Section 3). Second, information12
acquisition is costly to the principal, since she must compensate the agent for
his e⁄ort (participation constraint is binding). We note that a negative value of
information is a su¢ cient, but not a necessary, condition for overinvestment in
information to occur.
By her choice of b, the principal can control the agent￿ s information acquisition.
In most circumstances, the principal will not ￿nd it bene￿cial to completely resolve
the over- or underinvestment problem. Distortions arise because the principal
must take care of three control problems: she wishes to induce the agent to work
hard on the production task, to control how much attention the agent pays to his
private information (if he has any private information), and to control the agent￿ s
incentive to gather information.
It is worthwhile to compare the optimal incentive intensity under endogenous
information acquisition with the incentive that is optimal for exogenous informa-
tion. Endogenous information acquisition generally leads to an incentive intensity
that diverges from the optimal ex post intensity (i.e., the level of b that is optimal
when p is given) in order to steer the agent￿ s information gathering in the right
direction.
Proposition 2 When ￿ > 1 (￿ < 1), to provide the agent with stronger (weaker)
incentives to acquire information, the principal increases (reduces) the incentive
intensity compared to the ex post e¢ cient level.
Proof. We compare the (ex post) optimal bonus coe¢ cient for a given prob-
ability p, b￿
p; with the ex ante optimal bonus b￿(p): b￿(p) is greater than b￿
p if
Cov(v;y) > V ar(y) and smaller than b￿
p if Cov(v;y) < V ar(y):
Incentive contracts might be low powered, not only to reduce the amount of
distortion, given that the agent knows how to game the performance measure
(as in Baker, 1992, and Feltham and Xie, 1994) but also to reduce the agent￿ s
incentive to become informed in the ￿rst place since this information enables the
agent to engage in gaming. Hence, to induce the agent to pay less attention to13
the performance measure, his incentives might be muted.
To analyze the e⁄ect of changes in the performance measure￿ s characteristics
on the principal￿ s utility, for tractability, we assume that k(p) = 1
2Kp2: (We drop
the assumption limp!1 k0(p) = 1 and assume only that K is su¢ ciently high to
assure an internal solution for the choice of p.) Substituting this cost function
into (7) and (12), we obtain
b
￿ =
3p￿Cov(v;y) + ￿2
3p￿V ar(y) + ￿2 ; (15)
p
￿ =
1
2
b
￿2V ar(y)
K
: (16)
We provide the proof of the next proposition in the appendix.
Proposition 3 Let ￿￿ denote the principal￿ s utility in the optimal solution. Given
V ar(v); the performance measure￿ s quality depends on ￿; V ar(y) and K :
@￿￿
@￿
> 0;
@￿￿
@V ar(y)
8
> <
> :
> 0, if ￿ > 1
< 0, if ￿ < 1
;
@￿￿
@K
8
> <
> :
< 0, if ￿ ￿ 1
7 0, if ￿ < 1
:
Again, the principal￿ s utility increases with the correlation coe¢ cient ￿.
For ￿ > 1; the principal￿ s utility increases with V ar(y): There are now two
reasons: First, given that the agent is informed, the amount of distortion in the
e⁄ort choice e decreases (as discussed in Section 3). Second, the agent￿ s incentive
to obtain information increases, which in this case is bene￿cial to the principal.
In contrast, the principal￿ s utility decreases with V ar(y) if ￿ < 1: A larger V ar(y)
means a higher distortion in e and a stronger incentive to acquire information,
which in this case is detrimental to the principal. Hence, if ￿ converges to one,
there will be less distortion in both the e⁄ort choice e and the information acqui-
sition choice p.14
An increase in K has two e⁄ects. First, for a given p; the cost of information
acquisition, which is borne by the principal, increases. Second, all else equal,
the agent chooses a lower p. The ￿rst e⁄ect is unambiguously negative for the
principal. The second e⁄ect may be positive or negative, depending on whether ￿
is higher or lower than one. For ￿ > 1, these two e⁄ects reinforce each other and
the principal is worse o⁄ for higher levels of K. If ￿ < 1, the sign of @￿￿
@K depends
on which e⁄ect dominates: increased cost of information acquisition or the bene￿t
of a reduced information gathering.
The broader point here is that the quality of a performance measure not only
depends on the amount of distortion, assuming the agent knows how to game the
performance measure, but also on the di¢ culty (cost) of obtaining this information
as this information opens the door for gaming.
5 Example
As an example, we assume that the principal is concerned about the present value
of future cash ￿ ows from operations but that long-term performance evaluation
is not possible. Instead, the manager￿ s pay is based only on period 1 cash ￿ ows.
In a simple setting, there are two time periods and the manager chooses an
e⁄ort level prior to the realization of ￿rst-period cash ￿ ows. Let the present value
of total cash ￿ ow be PV (CF) = (c1 + c2)e, where c1e and c2e are ￿rst- and
second-period cash ￿ ows, respectively. Hence, v = c1 + c2; ￿ = E[c1] + E[c2];
and V ar(v) = V ar(c1) + V ar(c2) + 2Cov(c1;c2): Only ￿rst-period cash ￿ ows c1e
are available as a performance measure; long-term incentive contracts based on
second-period cash ￿ ows c2e are infeasible. Alternatively, we can interpret c2e as
the nonveri￿able part of cash ￿ ows or private bene￿ts accruing directly to the
principal.15
We adjust the performance measure and de￿ne y = ￿c1, with ￿ = ￿=E[c1]; to
obtain E[y] = ￿ and V ar(y) = ￿2V ar(c1): Hence, Cov(v;y) = Cov(￿c1;c1+c2) =
￿V ar(c1) + ￿Cov(c1;c2): If the agent is informed, he knows c1 and c2. Without
information, the agent knows only ￿. Applying Proposition 1, we can state
Lemma 3 The agent overinvests in information if
￿(c1;c2)
￿(c2)
E[c2]
<
￿(c1)
E[c1]
and underinvests if the inequality is reversed.
To discuss Lemma 3, we ￿rst assume that the two periods are symmetric with
E[c1] = E[c2] and ￿(c1) = ￿(c2). In this case, unless ￿(c1;c2) = 1, the agent invests
too much in information for b = 1 as ￿ < 1. From the principal￿ s perspective,
the problem is that the performance measure is too volatile, making information
more valuable for the agent than for the principal.
Lemma 4 Changing parameters, starting from E[c1] = E[c2], ￿(c1) = ￿(c2), and
￿(c1;c2) = 1, we obtain:
￿ ￿ < 1 , ￿(c1;c2) < 1:
￿ ￿ < 1 (￿ > 1) , ￿(c2) < ￿(c1) (￿(c2) > ￿(c1)).
￿ ￿ < 1 (￿ > 1) , E[c2] > E[c1] (E[c2] < E[c1]).
Ceteris paribus, we expect higher powered incentives if second-period cash ￿ ows
(nonveri￿able cash ￿ ows or private bene￿ts) have higher variance or lower expected
value relative to ￿rst-period cash ￿ ows (veri￿able cash ￿ ows), and if the correlation
between both is high. Incentives are reduced if the opposite holds.16
6 Conclusion
When performance pay is used to encourage agents to work on productive tasks,
agents also have incentives to obtain information about the impact of their actions
on the performance measure. The desire to obtain information increases as the
strength of the incentive contract increases.
We ￿nd that the quality of a performance measure depends on the agent￿ s in-
formation about the impact of his action on this measure. The principal might
be better o⁄ if the agent does not perfectly understand how his action a⁄ects the
performance measure. Baker (2002) and Heckman, Heinrich and Smith (1997)
discuss an example where this problem arises. Members of the Job Training Part-
nership Act (JTPA) train the disadvantaged for the job market. JTPA centers
are rewarded for successfully placing their clients. This incentive system induces
gaming in the sense that only the less disadvantaged are accepted into the pro-
gram.
Put di⁄erently, JTPA employees choose a high e⁄ort level for those clients
for which the marginal productivity is high (i.e., for those who can be placed
well with higher probability for any e⁄ort level) and choose zero e⁄ort for those
clients for which the marginal productivity is low. As Baker (2002) argues, the
performance measure is poor since it induces the wrong behavior. The analysis
in our paper illustrates another important aspect of the problem. Agents can
(easily) distinguish the most disadvantaged from the less disadvantaged, i.e., the
cost of information acquisition is low. This information makes it possible for
agents to engage in gaming. If the objective is to take the same high level of
care for all disadvantaged, the performance measure would be more powerful in
providing the right incentives if agents were uninformed about clients￿abilities.
This example shows that the quality of a performance measure does not only
depend on the gaming possibilities of an informed agent, but also on the cost of
acquiring information since this information opens the door for gaming.17
Appendix
The e⁄ect of a marginal change of x 2 fV ar(y);￿;Kg on the principal￿ s ex-
pected utility is
￿ = p
￿
bE[vy] ￿
1
2
b
2E[y
2]
￿
+ (1 ￿ p)
￿
b￿
2 ￿
1
2
b
2￿
2
￿
￿
1
2
Kp
2
where p = 1
2b2 V ar(y)
K : Rearranging yields
￿ = pbCov(v;y) ￿
1
2
pb
2V ar(y) + b￿
2 ￿
1
2
￿
2b
2 ￿
1
2
Kp
2:
Moreover,
d￿
dx
=
@￿
@b
@b
@x
+
@￿
@p
￿
@p
@x
+
@p
@b
@b
@x
￿
+
@￿
@x
=
@￿
@p
@p
@x
+
@￿
@x
;
since in equilibrium, b is chosen such that @￿
@b + @￿
@p
@p
@b = 0:
In addition,
@￿
@p
= bCov(v;y) ￿
1
2
b
2V ar(y) ￿ Kp
and because of (16),
@￿
@p
= b(Cov(v;y) ￿ bV ar(y)):
Hence,
d￿
dx
= b(Cov(v;y) ￿ bV ar(y))
@p
@x
+
@￿
@x
: (17)
Variation of ￿y Substituting ￿y into (17) yields
d￿
d￿y
= b(Cov(v;y) ￿ bV ar(y))
@p
@￿y
+
@￿
@￿y
and, hence,
d￿
d￿y
= b(Cov(v;y) ￿ bV ar(y))
￿
b2V ar(y)
￿yK
￿
+
pb
￿y
(Cov(v;y) ￿ bV ar(y)):
From (16) one obtains
d￿
d￿y
= 3
pb
￿y
(Cov(v;y) ￿ bV ar(y)):
Therefore, in equilibrium we have d￿
d￿y > 0 if Cov(v;y) > V ar(y) and d￿
d￿y < 0 if
Cov(v;y) < V ar(y):18
Variation of ￿ : Using (17) we have now
d￿
d￿
= b(Cov(v;y) ￿ bV ar(y))
@p
@￿
+
@￿
@￿
:
Since
@p
@￿ = 0;
d￿
d￿
= pb￿v￿y;
which is positive.
Variation of K : From (17),
d￿
dK
= b(Cov(v;y) ￿ bV ar(y))
@p
@K
+
@￿
@K
:
Because of
@p
@K = ￿1
2b2 V ar(y)
K2 = ￿
p
K and @￿
@K = ￿1
2p2,
d￿
dK
= ￿
pb
K
(Cov(v;y) ￿ bV ar(y)) ￿
1
2
p
2:
Using (16), this can be rewritten as
d￿
dK
= ￿
pb
K
￿
Cov(v;y) ￿
3
4
bV ar(y)
￿
:
Cov(v;y) > 3
4bV ar(y) always holds whenever Cov(v;y) > bV ar(y): Cov(v;y) >
bV ar(y) always holds for b￿ whenever Cov(v;y) > V ar(y): Therefore, in equilib-
rium the sign of the derivative is negative for Cov(v;y) ￿ V ar(y): For Cov(v;y) <
V ar(y) the sign of the derivative may be positive or negative. 33
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